Humanistic Mathematics As Mathematics for All by Fried, Michael N.
Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal
Issue 27 Article 15
Winter 1-1-2004
Humanistic Mathematics As Mathematics for All
Michael N. Fried
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/hmnj
Part of the Mathematics Commons, and the Science and Mathematics Education Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Claremont at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fried, Michael N. (2004) "Humanistic Mathematics As Mathematics for All," Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal: Iss. 27, Article
15.
Available at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/hmnj/vol1/iss27/15
Humanistic Mathematics as Mathematics for All  
Michael N. Fried 
Program for Science and Technology Education 
Ben Gurion University of the Negev 
P. O. B. 653, Beer Sheva 
84105 Israel 
mfried@bgumail.bgu.ac.il 
 
 The phrase, ‘Mathematics for All’, has a certain ambiguity.  It may be taken as an 
exhortation -- ‘Mathematics for all!’, or as an indication of a special kind of 
mathematics, ‘mathematics-for-all’.  These two ways of reading the phrase can be 
translated into two closely related questions: 1) Should mathematics really be for all? 
and 2) Are there aspects of mathematics, or parts of mathematics, truly appropriate 
for all?  Since one question inevitably leads to the other, the ambiguity of 
‘mathematics for all’ reveals only that there are two sides to this one coin.  We shall 
begin, then, with the first question and conclude with the second. 
 
I. 
Asking whether mathematics should be taught to everyone presupposes that 
mathematics is something everyone is able to do.  As we all too painfully know, there 
are plenty of people happy to confess that mathematics was something they never 
could do.  There are also, at the other extreme, those sanguine pedagogues who 
earnestly believe that one can learn anything if only properly taught.  The truth, of 
course, lies somewhere in between.  For no one can doubt that people have limits.  
But, people also have potential, and they can learn more than they think and they have 
learned more than often they are willing to say.  Thus, defining the limits of students’ 
ability, finding ways to teach students what they can learn, and developing methods of 
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evaluation that reveal what students have learned are, without a doubt, legitimate 
goals for educators, and, in fact, are the mainstay for most educational researchers.  In 
this piece, however, I am advancing this concern:  that the question of whether 
mathematics should be taught to everyone should not be dismissed by the argument of  
“impregnable barrier of inability,”  and that, therefore, it is at least reasonable to ask 
whether, indeed, there is some urgency to the idea that mathematics should be for all. 
To begin, one should recognize that mathematics was not always considered an 
essential part of the school curriculum.  In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for 
example, manyhumanist thinkers argued against the importance of mathematics as a 
basic component in general education.  Ironically, their reason had to do with the 
relevance of mathematics to human life.  As Geoffery Howson   says,  
“Indeed, mathematics held little appeal for the humanists.  Vives   was 
something of an exception, although even he had qualifications to as a 
component of general education.  Erasmus considered it a subject which 
those sufficiently far advanced might ‘taste’, but, in general, the 
humanists were not attracted by a purely abstract, as geometry.  The effect 
of the humanist movement on the school curriculum can be seen in the 
timetable of a typical Elizabethan grammar school.”1 
 
Even at the turn of the nineteen century, one finds in Germany, for example, that 
“...mathematics was taught as a marginal subject at best, given the near-monopolistic 
status of the classical languages.”2   Indeed, one tends to forget that elementary school 
was until fairly recently still commonly known as “grammar school,” betraying its 
principal traditional function of teaching Latin and Greek grammar.   
One might expect that among the Greeks, whose mathematical accomplishments 
were so great and so much a part of everything we think of as Greek,  there would be 
an unequivocal recognition of the importance of mathematical education for all.  Yet, 
when Protagoras describes to Socrates the kind of education fit for the children of the 
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polis, he says that “...when the boys have learned their letters and are ready to 
understand the written word as formerly the spoken, they set the works of good poets 
before them on their desks to read and make them learn them by heart, poems 
containing much admonition and many stories, eulogies, and panegyrics of the good 
men of old, so that the child may be inspired to imitate them and long to be like 
them.”3  As for the other aspects of elementary education, Protagoras speaks of music4 
by which youth will “...become more civilized, more balanced, and better adjusted in 
themselves and so more capable in whatever they say or do...,” and of gymnastics “so 
that a good mind may have a good body to serve it, and no one be forced by physical 
weakness to play the coward in war and other ordeals.”5  Protagoras’ program is, more 
or less, Socrates’ own initial proposal, in Books II and III of the Republic, for the 
education of children who are to become the guardians of the ideal state.  Moreover, 
later in the dialogue, when Socrates reviews this initial proposal with Glaucon to find 
out what might be missing, Glaucon says, “...what other study is left apart from music, 
gymnastics, and the arts?”6  Ian Mueller makes the obvious observation: “In neither 
case is there a mention of anything mathematical,”7 and goes on to say that, despite an 
apparent common ability to perform calculations such as  2000/10 and 3x700,8 “...it 
appears that the average Athenian citizen knew remarkable little arithmetic from our 
point of view and that he did not acquire his knowledge in school.  But even if he did 
learn arithmetic at school, we have no right to assume he learned any geometry, 
astronomy, or music theory, despite the fact that we have plenty of evidence 
associating these subjects with the intellectual heights of fifth-century culture.”9   
The expectation one has that the Greeks should promote universal mathematics 
education is, of course, not completely unfounded.  In the passage quoted above from 
the Republic, Plato, in the voice of Socrates, points out to Glaucon that the guardians’ 
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education lacks training in the mathematical sciences, arithmetic, geometry, and 
astronomy.  In the case of geometry, Glaucon recognizes the practical importance of 
geometry, especially in the conduct of war:  “For in dealing with encampments and 
the occupation of strong places and the bringing of troops into column and line and all 
the other formations of an army in actual battle and on the march, an officer who had 
studied geometry would be a very different person from what he would be if he had 
not.”10  Socrates does not deny this practical importance, but says that these 
applications only require “...a slight modicum of geometry and calculation...”; 
Socrates thinks that the study of geometry (as he does the other mathematical 
sciences) turns one’s soul to the true being of things and eventually to the idea of the 
good itself.11  One must keep in mind, however, that even here the dialogue is 
referring to the education of an elite, the education of the guardians, the future rulers 
of the ideal state, not the education of all.  Plato himself perhaps recognizes the 
desirability of all citizens of a republic to have some true understanding of 
mathematics, but he has profound reservations about the ability to achieve such a goal.  
This is clear from a well known passage in the Laws, in which the Athenian says to 
Clinias, the Cretan, that “...there are, of course, three subjects for the freeborn still to 
study.  Ciphering and arithmetic make one subject; mensuration, linear, superficial,, 
and solid, taken as one single study, forms a second; the third is the true relations of 
the planetary orbits to one another.  The elaborate prosecution of all these studies into 
their minute details is not for the masses but for a select few...For the multitude it will 
be proper to learn so much of the matter as is indispensable, and as it may truly be 
said to be a disgrace to the common man not to know, though it would be hard, or 
actually impossible, to pursue the research into minute detail.”12 
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II. 
 Plato’s discussion of the importance of mathematics education is, as we have just 
said, was directed towards the future leaders of Athens or the select few who become 
guardians of the ideal state.  Democratic traditions have developed since then, and we 
now tend to see all children as future leaders, or, at least, this is our rhetoric in 
speaking about such things.13  This is why, perhaps, the justifications given for 
mathematics education for an elite within the text of the Platonic dialogues, and two 
in particular,14 are still familiar mutatis mutandis as justifications of mathematics for 
all.   Thus, most arguments supporting mathematics for all are elaborations of two 
basic claims: 1) that mathematics is useful, and 2) that mathematics leads to a way of 
thinking that allows one to understand other things beyond mathematics itself.  Not 
much needs to be said about the first.  As for the second, Plato thought that 
mathematics could lead to thinking about things in themselves, for mathematical 
objects were, for Plato, intermediaries between the ever-changing things of this world 
and the world of completely unchanging and intelligible forms where one can find the 
true source of human knowledge and, more importantly, of human justice.15  One 
usually hears the second claim in a form in which Plato’s emphasis on the objects of 
mathematical thinking has been redirected to the character of mathematical thinking 
itself, its precision and its rigor.16 The stress on the importance of mathematics as a 
problem-solving activity, for example, is one version of this claim.  Indeed, the 
interest in problem-solving would not be nearly so extensive if one thought that 
problem-solving in mathematics had nothing to do with problem-solving in other 
aspects of our lives.  
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 The two claims listed above, that mathematics is useful and that mathematics aids 
thinking in general, certainly make mathematics a worthy subject, but are they truly 
arguments showing that mathematics should be taught to everyone?  They are, of 
course, to the extent one considers schools as democratic institutions, that is, as 
institutions that serve democracy.  In general, the centrality of education in 
determining a successful democracy is common to almost all thinking about 
democracy.  In Thomas Jefferson’s thought, for example, one cannot separate the 
concern for the health of the republic and the education of its citizens.17  Thus, in the 
preamble to his “Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge” (1779), Jefferson 
writes, “Whereas it appeareth that however certain forms of government are better 
calculated than others to protect individuals in the free exercise of their natural rights, 
and are at the same time themselves better guarded against degeneracy, yet experience 
hath shewn, that even under the best forms, those entrusted with power have, in time, 
and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny; and it is believed that the most 
effectual means of preventing this would be, to illuminate, as far as practicable, the 
minds of the people at large, and more especially to give them knowledge of those 
facts, which history exhibiteth, that, possessed thereby of the experience of other ages 
and countries, they may be enabled to know ambition under all its shapes, and prompt 
to exert their natural powers to defeat its purposes.”18 In Jefferson’s vision of 
education, there was, moreover, no question as to the importance of mathematics and 
the sciences in general for this end.  Accordingly, he says that in the grammar schools 
(roughly equivalent to our high-school) “...shall be taught the Latin and Greek 
languages, English grammar, geography, and the higher part of numerical 
arithmetick, to wit, vulgar and decimal fractions, and the extraction of the square and 
cube roots [emphasis added].”19 Jefferson’s sense that an enlightened polity means, 
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among other things, a polity that is no stranger to scientific thought is clear also from 
his proposed program of studies for the University of Virginia, which included under 
the heading “Mathematics, pure,” “Algebra; Fluxions [calculus]; Geometry, 
Elementary, Transcendental; Architecture [!], Military, Naval,” and under the heading 
“Physico-Mathematics,” “Mechanics; Statics; Dynamics; Pneumatics; Acoustics; 
Optics; Astronomy; Geography.”20 Indeed, these make up almost a third of the total 
subjects to be taught at the university.   
That mathematics is both useful and develops clear analytical thinking, needless 
to say, fit well into the Jeffersonian scheme.  Obviously, clear analytic thinking, the 
ability to form arguments and counter-arguments, the power to discern sham 
reasoning, and the habit of being precise about terms form a firm defense against the 
perversion of a good government into a tyranny.  The democratic implication of 
mathematics’ utility, on the other hand, is evident not only in its allowing a wider 
range of people to make a positive contribution to society, but also in its removing the 
barriers which might prevent people taking up more sophisticated and lucrative 
professions (particularly, one might add, professions to which political power is 
attached).  Jefferson makes the last point plain when he writes that “[At the district 
schools] might be taught English grammar, the higher branches of numerical 
arithmetic, the geometry of straight lines and of the circle, the elements of navigation, 
and geography to a sufficient degree, and thus afford the greater numbers the means of 
being qualified for the various vocations of life, needing more instruction than merely 
menial or praedial labor...”21  In one of its “modern” incarnations, the argument from 
utility is the “technology argument” – we live in a technological society, mathematics 
is indispensable in technology, therefore, the mathematics is essential to success in 
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society.  For many, the “technology argument” is the most potent argument implying 
the endorsement of mathematics education for all.   
Yet, despite the plausibility of the two arguments given so far for mathematics 
for all, something about them, nevertheless, does not ring true.  To begin, consider the 
arguments claiming that it is the usefulness of mathematics that gives mathematics  
for all  its urgency.  These have a wide range.  At the crudest level -- though, I must 
sadly confess, the argument here is a very common one – one makes the case that 
acceptance into universities or other institutions or organizations is barred for anyone 
who cannot demonstrate some proficiency in mathematics, proficiency that is usually 
determined by an examination or school grades.  The kindest comment one can make 
regarding the “institutional utility”    of mathematics is that it begs the question.  
Anyone who genuinely cares about mathematics, however, should further object that 
the argument to “institutional utility,” in fact, discounts any deeper use of 
mathematics beyond its being a mere device for selection, a capacity for which it 
would be an arbitrary choice except for the fact that most people find mathematics 
hard.  Though this is, I admit, a use, and one does use such words as “device” or 
“tool” to describe mathematics in this very instrumental role; it is not really a use of 
mathematics per se since it is related, at best, only tangentially to its content.   
As for the “technology argument,” there is no doubt that mathematics has had a 
decisive role in the development of the machines and systems that we have come so 
much to depend on, and there is no sign that the importance of mathematics here will, 
in the future, in any way diminish.  Thus, it is not an arbitrary policy that future 
computer engineers be required to have a relatively deep understanding of, say, 
combinatorics, probability, and number theory.  But what of the users of technology?  
After all, while the number of people who actually devise some new technology is 
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relatively small, there is hardly a person, in the developed world at least, who does not 
use fairly advanced technology almost every day.  For users of technology, however, 
the importance of knowing what makers of technology know is not at all clear.  
Indeed, it is almost in the very nature of technology that knowledge of the inner 
workings of machines becomes progressively irrelevant for those who only use 
machines.  Thus, as the writer Robert O’Brien says,  
“Increasingly, engineers are designing people out of the machine process.  
The purposes are practical: to eliminate human error, fatigue, boredom; to 
introduce faster, safer, more economical and consistent methods of 
production; to fulfill the incessant human striving for abundance.  And 
even as their designers toil, the machines themselves seem to be groping 
more and more toward self-sufficiency, impelled by the same blind will 
with which a vine climbs toward the sun.  The telephone system that 
began with hand cranks and ‘Hello’ girls is today a marvel of automatic 
control. In place of the philosophic elevator man who joked about his ‘ups 
and downs’ is a panel of plastic push buttons.”22  
 
 
As a technology progresses, it seems, one needs to be less and less of a 
specialist to use it; the development of a technology is marked by increasing 
“user-friendliness.”  This means that mere functioning in a technological world 
does not depend on knowing its technological foundations.  However, 
functioning intelligently in the technological world does, I think, involve an 
understanding of its conceptual foundations; one should know, for example, the 
difference between the “precision” of 3.1415926 and the “precision” of  pi.  This 
implies an approach which is more reflective and less attached to immediate 
applications; one might conceive such a reflective approach as still directed 
towards mathematics’ usefulness but, it must be granted, only in an equivocal 
sense.  Similar things could be said regarding mathematics’ usefulness in the 
exact sciences. 
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Mathematics as a path to general types of thinking is, in a sense, also an assertion of 
the usefulness of mathematics, and it is a very strong one at that.  With that, however, 
it is also open to the same criticism regarding the “institutional utility” of 
mathematics, namely, that thinking of mathematics in this light makes the content of 
mathematics of only secondary importance, if important at all.  But, beyond that 
criticism, one wonders about the truth of the claim itself.  Consider the most common 
version of the claim: namely, that “A strong emphasis on mathematical concepts and 
understandings ... supports the development of problem solving.”23 The first question 
one should ask is, What kind of problems are meant here?  As I mentioned above, the 
very strength of the claim comes from its referring to problems other than purely 
mathematical ones.  Certainly, Pólya, to whom we owe this concentration on problem 
solving in mathematics education probably more than anyone else, saw his work on 
heuristics as applicable to areas other than mathematics, for he saw problem solving 
as, in some way, central to all thought.  In fact, “The tenet underlying all of Pólya’s 
writing and teaching on problem solving was that if taught and learned appropriately, 
mathematics improves the mind and implants good habits of thought.”24 But Pólya 
began with mathematical problems, his books concentrate on mathematical problems, 
and one suspects that his many beautiful insights relate most properly only to 
mathematical problems or problems that can be framed as mathematical problems.  
The sad fact, though, is that, despite the optimism born in the 16th and 17th centuries 
that all problems would eventually be open to a mathematical-like treatment,25 most 
real-life problems of real significance still remain outside the realm of mathematics.  
This is because such real-life problems involve, more often than not, a judgment of 
ends rather than a choice of means.  Thus, Eva T. H. Brann writes:  
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“The presumption in coming to school to learn to solve human problems 
is that human affairs are amenable to something like an algebraic 
treatment, that they can be clearly formulated in terms of knowns and 
unknowns, and that they maybe foretold as well as resolved by an 
application of the proper technique.  It is a faith encouraged by certain 
academics who, though no less mere theoreticians than any of their 
colleagues, want to invest their subject with irresistible urgency.  Be that 
as it may, the mere formulation of such a problem represents...so 
enormous a rational determination that students need a thorough 
intellectual foundation to give them some critical independence with 
respect to the whole genre of theories constructed for practical 
applications.”26  
 
The “thorough intellectual foundation” Brann speaks about clearly contains some 
thoughtful exposure to mathematics, but it is far from clear that mathematics has any 
dominant part here; even Jefferson, whom we cited as a supporter of scientific 
education, still saw history, and not mathematics, as probably the most important of 
one’s studies.27  
 
III. 
There is no denying that, while most problems of deep concern to citizens and policy 
makers alike are not amenable to the type of thinking one applies in mathematical 
problems, still the range of questions for which mathematical reasoning is relevant is 
very great.  This is certainly true in the exact sciences where attempts to remove the 
mathematical presentation usually result in an oversimplification at best and a 
complete distortion of the facts at worst.28  Therefore, I do not disagree that for a true 
understanding of the exact sciences, at least, one needs a firm grasp of its 
mathematical underpinning.  The question is, however, as it was in my remarks about 
technology, whether this is an appropriate argument for mathematics for all.  What 
shall we say to the student who has no interest whatsoever in physics or computer 
 12
science?  Here, I would like to return to the passage from Plato’s Laws quoted at the 
end of the first section.  For besides the two arguments we derived from that and the 
passage from the Republic, there is, I think, another more subtle argument in the 
former.   
At the end of the passage from the Laws, the Athenian says that it is a disgrace 
for the citizens not to know the details of mathematical researches.  The sort of 
disgrace I think Plato has in mind can be illustrated by the apocryphal story told about 
Plato and the doubling of the cube: “Eratosthenes in his work entitled Platonicus 
relates that, when the god proclaimed to the Delians by the oracle that, if they would 
get rid of a plague, they should construct an altar double of the existing one, their 
craftsmen fell into great perplexity in their efforts to discover how a solid could be 
made double of a (similar) solid; they therefore went to ask Plato about it, and he 
replied that the oracle meant, not that the god wanted an altar of double the size, but 
that he wished, in setting them the task, to shame the Greeks [emphasis added] for 
their neglect of mathematics and their contempt for geometry.”29 The twist in the 
story, of course, is that the  shame the Delians were to feel was not that from a sense 
of ineptness before a practical task, although they were led to believe that it was a 
practical task they were to carry out, and thought, accordingly, that it was a job for 
their craftsmen.30  The Delians’ shame was in not knowing the deeper foundations of 
their own altar; their contempt for geometry meant that they were not, in some way, 
in full possession of their own world.  The lesson of the story, then, is that knowing 
mathematics and not scorning geometry is important at bottom not because it allows 
one to solve practical problems, though it may do this, but because it allows one more 
fully to belong in one’s own world, and, therefore, the neglect of mathematics is a 
disgrace not for the craftsman alone among the Delians, but for all the Delians. 
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   The need to belong, I think, provides a sound motivation for mathematics for 
all.  The sense of belonging that one aims for, however, applies to the greater world, 
the natural world, the world that science contemplates, as well as the more provincial 
world of one’s own culture.  
 I want to end this piece with some remarks about the latter; these remarks also 
touch on the kind of mathematics appropriate for all, the second side of the coin with 
which this essay began.  To start, I do not want to consider the presence of 
mathematical thinking in different cultures, though this has in recent years become a 
lively area of research with many impressive findings. I only want to stress that 
mathematics has a central place in western culture, and, therefore, mathematics is as 
much a part of cultural education as the study of literature is.  In the English speaking 
world, one reads Shakespeare not because one aims to be a Shakespearean scholar but, 
to borrow Plato’s phrase, because it is a disgrace for an English speaker never once to 
have savored a line of Shakespeare’s English.  It should be as natural to expect 
someone in the western world to have savored Euclid’s proof of Pythagoras’ theorem.  
Yet, this is not the case.  One tends to see the reading of works by mathematicians and 
scientists as a somewhat esoteric activity reserved for historians, biographers and 
archivists.  There is, in this way, a kind of double standard in education.  For at any 
level of education it is taken for granted that the study of literature is the study of the 
works of literature; hardly anyone doubts the inadequacy of a mere textbook approach 
to literature in which the stories of Shakespeare’s tragedies are merely told or the 
themes in Frost’s poetry merely listed.  In mathematics education, however, the 
textbook approach is the only approach.  Accordingly, our students end up, more often 
than not, only with a textbook understanding of the subject; they are not left with the 
sense of having faced great ideas of great thinkers, a sense which can truly enrich and 
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inspire.31  Emerson said that “Activity is contagious.  Looking where others look, and 
conversing with the same things, we catch the charm which lured them...Talk much 
with any man of vigorous mind, and we acquire very fast the habit of looking at things 
in the same light, and on each occurrence we anticipate his thought.”32 One seems 
painfully aware of this in literature education but oblivious to it in mathematics 
education.     
The approach to learning mathematics by reading works of mathematics33 would 
be misconstrued if it were taken as a purely historical approach.  It involves, rather, 
the recognition that living mathematics is a product of the imagination of real 
people.34 I mean this quite seriously: mathematics is a fundamentally human 
endeavor, as much as literature, and must be studied in this way; it is not so much a 
matter of knowing Euclid did this or Gauss did that, but that this thought is in Euclid 
this and this in Gauss.  Tymoczko makes a distinction similar to the one I am trying to 
make when he says, “It is mathematics with a human face because there is no 
mathematical discipline without a human face.  Stories of mathematicians are ‘color’.  
It is interesting that Tartaglia was a stammerer who extracted a promise from 
Cardano.  But stories about what historical individuals say when they looked on the 
mathematical universe at historical points of time are not color.  They are 
mathematics.  No one can learn mathematics without being inculcated into this 
tradition.”35  One might say that this is precisely the historical approach, and perhaps I 
would say so too if it were not so common to think of the historical approach in the 
pejorative sense of being about dead ideas.  I am not proposing ‘mathematics for all’ 
consists in learning dead ideas.  One thinks one can ignore great works such as 
Euclid’s Elements or Descartes’ La Géométrie as being no longer relevant, or 
Shakespeare’s plays as no longer current, but this is like thinking that one can come 
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into the middle of a conversation and still really know what is going on.  Indeed, being 
engaged in the reading of such great works is, as  Robert Hutchins put it, to be 
engaged in a “great conversation.”36  Thus, while it does not seem to me an injustice 
not to provide one with technical training for a scientific profession that one does not 
really want, it does seem to me an injustice to keep one out of this “great 
conversation,” for this is something truly belonging to everyone in society and is 
behind any sense of belonging in one’s culture.  What allows one to participate fully 
in this “conversation,” therefore, should be our guide in thinking about ‘mathematics 
for all’, both in its justification and its content.  And it is the humanizing participation 
in the ‘great conversation’ that makes ‘mathematics for all’ deeply humanistic 
mathematics. 
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wit be wandering, let him study the mathematics; for in demonstrations, if his wit be called away never 
so little, he must begin again.”  One finds this perspective also in Locke who writes in Of the Conduct of 
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25
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should not have to break our heads as much as is necessary today, and yet we should be sure of 
accomplishing everything the given facts allow. 
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General Science” [1677] in Leibniz: Selections, Philip P. Wiener, ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1951), p.15).   
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separate reason from imagination, simply for the convenience of the school timetable” (“The 
Imaginative Mind in Science,” in The Visionary Eye: Essays in the Arts, Literature, and Science 
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